### 经济代写|产业经济学代写Industrial Economics代考|ECON3516

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• Statistical Inference 统计推断
• Statistical Computing 统计计算
• (Generalized) Linear Models 广义线性模型
• Statistical Machine Learning 统计机器学习
• Longitudinal Data Analysis 纵向数据分析
• Foundations of Data Science 数据科学基础

Whinston $(1987,1988)$ examines an oligopoly in which capacity is adjustable in lumps equal to plant size. In this framework he shows that it is difficult to reach any general conclusions about the pattern of plant closures. When each firm controls several differently sized plants, there is no theoretical prediction about the order of exit. There are several complications. A firm that withdraws a small plant now may be at a strategic disadvantage later if its remaining plants are large. Or a firm with many small plants may find this flexibility disadvantageous against a larger firm with one big plant. Thus, it is hard to separate out the effect of flexibility versus size. To focus on size alone, Whinston considers a special case when all plants are equally sized. There is still a complication; who moves first to break a tie between the two largest firms? The structured pattern of exit returns when the equilibrium play is independent of the tie-breaking rule (a quasi-markov equilibrium) – only the largest firms reduce capacity. Following the proof of theorem 1, we discuss the relationship between our results in greater detail.

In the present analysis we prefer to maintain the assumption of complete information: in the typical declining industry competitors are well acquainted, and the production technologies embodied in extant investments are common knowledge. The payoffs to allowing re-entry or stochastic demand trajectories are probably limited: the papers cited above suggest that smallness continues to be a competitive advantage with these generalizations.

We believe that there is a large payoff in extending the models of exit beyond the all-or-nothing production technology. Although such technologies characterize some industries with large, inflexible plants such as alumina refining (see Ghemawat and Nalebuff, 1985), firms usually shrink continuously as demand declines (soda ash, rayon, baby foods, vacuum tubes, cigars, and electric coffee percolators are some of the many examples: see Harrigan, 1980). We study competition under the opposite of all-or-nothing adjustment; we focus on production technologies where capacity is continuously adjustable. This allows us to model the effect of size differences without the complication of differential flexibility.

## 经济代写|产业经济学代写Industrial Economics代考|Theoretical studies

Recent theoretical studies of competition in declining industries include Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985, 1990), Londregan (1987), Reynolds (1988), and Whinston (1988). These studies use the logic of backward induction to predict the sequence of exits or capacity reductions when demand is perceived as ultimately diminishing to zero. ${ }^{1}$ While the specific models differ slightly in their assumptions and results, all point out the potential strategic liability of large firm size.

Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985) analyse the case in which producers have equal costs, demand is declining monotonically, and divestment is an all-or-nothing decision – firms either continue to operate at full capacity or exit the industry. Under these assumptions, Ghemawat and Nalebuff (hereafter G\&N) prove the existence of a unique subgame-perfect Cournot-Nash equilibrium: the smaller of two equally efficient duopolists forces its larger rival to exit as soon as duopoly profits turn negative. The intuition behind this result is that the smaller producer, having lower output, can operate as a profitable monopolist over a longer period of time as demand falls. Recognizing this fact, the larger firm exits first.

Generalized to the oligopoly case, the G\&N (1985) model implies that exit occurs in decreasing order of firm size. Ghemawat and Nalebuff argue that this sequence is robust to the existence of small interfirm cost differences. Moreover, the basic conclusions hold under more general conditions in which industry re-entry is permitted (Londregan, 1987).

## 经济代写|产业经济学代写Industrial Economics代考|Theoretical studies

Ghemawat 和 Nalebuff (1985) 分析了生产者成本相同、需求单调下降、撤资是一个全有或全无的决定的情况——公司要么继续满负荷运营，要么退出该行业。在这些假设下，Ghemawat 和 Nalebuff（以下简称 G\&N）证明了一个独特的子博弈完美 Cournot-Nash 均衡的存在：一旦双头垄断利润变为负数，两个同样有效的双头垄断者中较小的一个会迫使其较大的竞争对手退出。这一结果背后的直觉是，随着需求下降，产量较低的较小生产商可以在较长时间内作为盈利的垄断者运营。认识到这一事实，较大的公司首先退出。

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## MATLAB代写

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