Statistics-lab™可以为您提供ac.in HS440 Industrial Economics产业经济学课程的代写代考和辅导服务！

HS440 Industrial Economics课程简介

This course will provide students with a survey of economic models in industrial organization, applied to innovation-related issues. The course is divided into three sections. In the first one, we introduce the concept of innovation, its measurement and how it is related to knowledge. In the second part, we look at innovation at the firm level. In particular, we delve into the “knowledge- creating” company and its strategies. Finally, we analyze the structure and evolution of several hi-tech industries, in terms of survival of existing firms and creation of new firms. Prereq: ECON 401 and ECON 402. Writing intensive.

PREREQUISITES 

This course will provide students with an overview of economic models in industrial organization, specifically related to innovation. The course is divided into three sections.

In the first section, students will be introduced to the concept of innovation, including its measurement and how it is related to knowledge. This section will likely cover topics such as the different types of innovation (e.g., product innovation, process innovation, organizational innovation), how innovation is measured (e.g., patents, R&D spending), and the relationship between knowledge creation and innovation.

The second section of the course will focus on innovation at the firm level. Students will learn about the strategies that companies use to create and manage knowledge, with a particular emphasis on the so-called “knowledge-creating” company. This section may also cover topics such as the role of intellectual property rights in innovation, the relationship between innovation and market power, and the impact of innovation on firm performance.

In the final section of the course, students will analyze the structure and evolution of several hi-tech industries. This section will likely include case studies of industries such as biotechnology, software, and telecommunications, and will examine factors such as the survival of existing firms and the creation of new firms in these industries.

Prerequisites for this course include ECON 401 (Microeconomic Theory) and ECON 402 (Market Structure and Pricing). Additionally, this course is writing-intensive, meaning that students will be expected to write multiple papers throughout the semester.

HS440 Industrial Economics HELP（EXAM HELP， ONLINE TUTOR）

Proof We prove the result for (b) first. Consider a set of strictly positive Cournot outputs, $q_i^, i=1, \ldots, n$, defined by $I_i\left(Q^, q_i^\right)=0$, and let $Q^=\sum_i q_i^$. If $q_i$ at the corresponding Cournot price $f\left(Q^\right)$, then $I_i\left(Q^, q_i\right)$ is positive because the $I_i$ function is decreasing in its second argument. Then, to prove part (a) we have by assumption that $\sum_i q_i$. Multiply all firms’ outputs by $\alpha$ and increase $\alpha$ from one to the level $\alpha^$ for which $\sum_i \alpha^* q_i=Q^$. We can easily see from the downward-sloping marginal revenue condition (1) that this will strictly decrease $I_i$ for all $i$. By (b) some firm $j$ will have a non-negative $I_j$ at $\alpha^$, and hence $I_j>0$ at the original outputs.

Proof First, consider the second stage, in which the common list price $\bar{p}$ is at any level between the Cournot and competitive prices. Since costs are symmetric and list-price sales quantities are equal, any unilateral discount to a price that is above the competitive level will be to a price that exceeds other firms’ marginal costs, and hence will be matched when these firms use their contractual option to meet a rival’s price cut and thereby maintain their output quantities. Therefore, a unilateral discount in the second stage from any common list price below the Cournot price will be unprofitable.

In the proposed equilibrium all firms announce the same list price, $\bar{p}$, in the first stage, so that we now consider the profitability of a unilateral deviation from this list price. As noted in section 2, we have modelled the public advance notification process in the first stage as an auction in which firms select list prices $\bar{p}_i, i=1, \ldots, n$, and the lowest preferred list price prevails: $\bar{p}=\min \left{\bar{p}_i, \ldots, \bar{p}_n\right}$. A unilateral increase in list price will not affect $\bar{p}$. A unilateral reduction in the list price by firm $i$ would reduce the prevailing common list price by an equal amount. Under assumption 4 this reduction in the list price would not increase the firm’s market share, $s_i$, which equals $1 / n$, and it follows from the earlier analysis of the second stage that there would be no discounting in the subgame determined by this lower common list price. Hence, a unilateral reduction in $\tilde{p}_i$ is unprofitable if $\left[f(Q) s_I Q_i-c_i\left(s_i Q\right)\right]$ is decreasing in $Q$, or equivalently, if
$$
\left.f^{\prime}(Q) s_i Q+s_i f(Q)-s_i c_i^{\prime}\left(s_i Q\right)\right]<0
$$

Textbooks

• An Introduction to Stochastic Modeling, Fourth Edition by Pinsky and Karlin (freely
available through the university library here)
• Essentials of Stochastic Processes, Third Edition by Durrett (freely available through
the university library here)
To reiterate, the textbooks are freely available through the university library. Note that
you must be connected to the university Wi-Fi or VPN to access the ebooks from the library
links. Furthermore, the library links take some time to populate, so do not be alarmed if
the webpage looks bare for a few seconds.

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