## 经济代写|产业经济学代写Industrial Economics代考|Predicting the price effects of mergers

statistics-lab™ 为您的留学生涯保驾护航 在代写产业经济学Industrial Economics方面已经树立了自己的口碑, 保证靠谱, 高质且原创的统计Statistics代写服务。我们的专家在代写产业经济学Industrial Economics代写方面经验极为丰富，各种代写产业经济学Industrial Economics相关的作业也就用不着说。

• Statistical Inference 统计推断
• Statistical Computing 统计计算
• (Generalized) Linear Models 广义线性模型
• Statistical Machine Learning 统计机器学习
• Longitudinal Data Analysis 纵向数据分析
• Foundations of Data Science 数据科学基础

## 经济代写|产业经济学代写Industrial Economics代考|Predicting the price effects of mergers

Werden (1991, p. 1003) argues in the special example that the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) and the non-equilibrium ‘change in the HHI’ (i.e., $2 s_1 s_2$, where $s_1$ and $s_2$ are the merging firms’ pre-merger market shares) are ‘reasonably good indicators of the effects of mergers on price’ in the sense that they have some of the same qualitative properties as price, when viewed as functions of firms’ market shares. What is the value of this observation?

If it were a rule of thumb for predicting when a merger would raise price, this might be useful; but in the example under discussion, all mergers raise price (Farrell and Shapiro, 1990a, p. 118). Moreover, we have provided a far more general necessary and sufficient condition for mergers to raise price in Cournot oligopoly (propositions 1 and 2 in Farrell and Shapiro (1990a, p. 112)), and our condition has little to do with the HHI.

Another possible point might be to estimate the size of the increase in price following from a merger. However, the appeal of any such rule of thumb depends on its being simple to use, and it seems that this rule requires us to use market-share numbers based not on sales but on ‘capital’, which of course is much harder to observe or even to interpret in a more general model. Moreover, Werden’s analysis toward this end is highly incomplete. In particular, the assumption that the total industry output produced in Cournot equilibrium is produced efficiently is ‘rather artificial’, as Werden admits in his footnote 7. In fact, unless all firms have identical market shares, their marginal costs also differ in Cournot equilibrium, so output is not efficiently produced, and this fact is an important ingredient of our analysis. Finally, Werden’s analysis seems superseded by the recent work of Robert Willig (1991), which studies more precisely how the net price effect of a merger depends on the degree of market concentration among non-participants, via the slope of their joint reaction function.

Finally, one might be interested in whether changes or levels of the HHI predict changes in welfare due to a merger or other change. We have separately provided a general necessary and sufficient condition (under Cournot oligopoly) for equilibrium increases in the $\mathrm{HHI}$ to go along with decreases in welfare (proposition 7 in Farrell and Shapiro, 1990b, p. 289). There, we showed that, starting from a Cournot equilibrium, an arbitrary change in all firms’ outputs, $\left{d x_i\right}$ for all $i$, causes welfare and the Herfindahl index $(H)$ to move in opposite directions if and only if
$$0 \leq \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n s_i d x_i}{d X} \leq H .$$
While we did not study the relationship between changes in welfare and the nonequilibrium ‘change in the $\mathrm{HHI}^{\prime}$ (i.e., $2 s_1 s_2$ ), we have yet to be persuaded that this is an interesting question.

Consider a monopolist that sells two substitute goods. The demand for the two goods is given by
$$q_i=q_i\left(P_1, P_2\right) \frac{\partial q_i}{\partial P_i}<0, \quad \frac{\partial q_i}{\partial P_j}>0 \quad i=1,2 \quad j=2,1$$
where $P_i$ and $Q_i$ represent the price and quantity of good $i$, respectively. Assume that the monopolist has constant per-unit costs $w_1$ and $w_2$, which may differ from the true social costs, $c_1$ and $c_2$, either because of taxes or market power upstream.
Assuming constant returns to scale, the monopolist’s profits are given by
$$\Pi=\left(P_1-w_1\right) q_1\left(P_1, P_2\right)+\left(P_2-w_2\right) q_2\left(P_1, P_2\right) \equiv f\left(P_1, P_2 ; w_1, w_2\right) .$$
The first-order conditions for profit maximization are
$$\frac{\partial f}{\partial P_i}=q_i+\left(P_1-w_1\right) \frac{\partial q_1}{\partial P_i}+\left(P_2-w_2\right) \frac{\partial q_2}{\partial P_i}=0 \quad i=1,2 .$$
The second-order conditions for a maximum are
\begin{aligned} & \frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial P_1^2}<0 \\ & \frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial P_1^2} \frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial P_2^2}-\left(\frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial P_1 \partial P_2}\right)^2>0 \end{aligned}
To find the effect of a change in $w_1$, totally differentiate (3) and solve for
\begin{aligned} & \frac{\partial P_1}{\partial w_1}=\frac{1}{D_1}\left[\frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial P_2^2} \frac{\partial q_1}{\partial P_1}-\frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial P_1 \partial P_2} \frac{\partial q_1}{\partial P_2}\right] \ & \frac{\partial P_2}{\partial w_2}=\frac{1}{D_1}\left[\frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial P_1^2} \frac{\partial q_1}{\partial P_2}-\frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial P_1 \partial P_2} \frac{\partial q_1}{\partial P_1}\right] \end{aligned}
where $$D_1=\frac{\partial^f}{\partial P_1^2} \frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial P_2^2}-\left(\frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial P_1 \partial P_2}\right)^2$$
The paradox is that the second-order conditions do not imply a definite sign for either (6) or (7). The one case that can be ruled out is the combination of $\partial P_1 / \partial w_1<0$ and $\partial P_2 / \partial w_1>0$. Salinger (1987) contains a proof.

# 产业经济学代考

## 经济代写|产业经济学代写Industrial Economics代考|Predicting the price effects of mergers

Werden (1991, p. 1003) 在特例中论证了 Herfindahl-Hirschman 指数 (HHI) 和非均衡“HHI 的变化” (即， $2 s_1 s_2$ ，在哪里 $s_1$ 和 $s_2$ 是合并公司的合并前市场份额) 是“相当好的合并对价格影响的指标”，因为 当被视为公司市场份额的函数时，它们具有与价格相同的一些定性属性。这个观察的价值是什么?

$$0 \leq \frac{\sum_{i=1}^n s_i d x_i}{d X} \leq H$$

$$q_i=q_i\left(P_1, P_2\right) \frac{\partial q_i}{\partial P_i}<0, \quad \frac{\partial q_i}{\partial P_j}>0 \quad i=1,2 \quad j=2,1$$

$$\Pi=\left(P_1-w_1\right) q_1\left(P_1, P_2\right)+\left(P_2-w_2\right) q_2\left(P_1, P_2\right) \equiv f\left(P_1, P_2 ; w_1, w_2\right) .$$

$$\frac{\partial f}{\partial P_i}=q_i+\left(P_1-w_1\right) \frac{\partial q_1}{\partial P_i}+\left(P_2-w_2\right) \frac{\partial q_2}{\partial P_i}=0 \quad i=1,2 .$$

\begin{aligned} & \frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial P_1^2}<0 \\ & \frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial P_1^2} \frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial P_2^2}-\left(\frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial P_1 \partial P_2}\right)^2>0 \end{aligned}

$$\frac{\partial P_1}{\partial w_1}=\frac{1}{D_1}\left[\frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial P_2^2} \frac{\partial q_1}{\partial P_1}-\frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial P_1 \partial P_2} \frac{\partial q_1}{\partial P_2}\right] \quad \frac{\partial P_2}{\partial w_2}=\frac{1}{D_1}\left[\frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial P_1^2} \frac{\partial q_1}{\partial P_2}-\frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial P_1 \partial P_2} \frac{\partial q_1}{\partial P_1}\right]$$

$$D_1=\frac{\partial^f}{\partial P_1^2} \frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial P_2^2}-\left(\frac{\partial^2 f}{\partial P_1 \partial P_2}\right)^2$$悖论是二阶条件并不意味着 (6) 或 (7) 的明确符号。可以排除的一种情况是 $\partial P_1 / \partial w_1<0$ 和 $\partial P_2 / \partial w_1>0$. Salinger (1987) 包含一个证明。

## 有限元方法代写

tatistics-lab作为专业的留学生服务机构，多年来已为美国、英国、加拿大、澳洲等留学热门地的学生提供专业的学术服务，包括但不限于Essay代写，Assignment代写，Dissertation代写，Report代写，小组作业代写，Proposal代写，Paper代写，Presentation代写，计算机作业代写，论文修改和润色，网课代做，exam代考等等。写作范围涵盖高中，本科，研究生等海外留学全阶段，辐射金融，经济学，会计学，审计学，管理学等全球99%专业科目。写作团队既有专业英语母语作者，也有海外名校硕博留学生，每位写作老师都拥有过硬的语言能力，专业的学科背景和学术写作经验。我们承诺100%原创，100%专业，100%准时，100%满意。

## MATLAB代写

MATLAB 是一种用于技术计算的高性能语言。它将计算、可视化和编程集成在一个易于使用的环境中，其中问题和解决方案以熟悉的数学符号表示。典型用途包括：数学和计算算法开发建模、仿真和原型制作数据分析、探索和可视化科学和工程图形应用程序开发，包括图形用户界面构建MATLAB 是一个交互式系统，其基本数据元素是一个不需要维度的数组。这使您可以解决许多技术计算问题，尤其是那些具有矩阵和向量公式的问题，而只需用 C 或 Fortran 等标量非交互式语言编写程序所需的时间的一小部分。MATLAB 名称代表矩阵实验室。MATLAB 最初的编写目的是提供对由 LINPACK 和 EISPACK 项目开发的矩阵软件的轻松访问，这两个项目共同代表了矩阵计算软件的最新技术。MATLAB 经过多年的发展，得到了许多用户的投入。在大学环境中，它是数学、工程和科学入门和高级课程的标准教学工具。在工业领域，MATLAB 是高效研究、开发和分析的首选工具。MATLAB 具有一系列称为工具箱的特定于应用程序的解决方案。对于大多数 MATLAB 用户来说非常重要，工具箱允许您学习应用专业技术。工具箱是 MATLAB 函数（M 文件）的综合集合，可扩展 MATLAB 环境以解决特定类别的问题。可用工具箱的领域包括信号处理、控制系统、神经网络、模糊逻辑、小波、仿真等。

## 经济代写|产业经济学代写Industrial Economics代考|Limits of the Cournot model

statistics-lab™ 为您的留学生涯保驾护航 在代写产业经济学Industrial Economics方面已经树立了自己的口碑, 保证靠谱, 高质且原创的统计Statistics代写服务。我们的专家在代写产业经济学Industrial Economics代写方面经验极为丰富，各种代写产业经济学Industrial Economics相关的作业也就用不着说。

• Statistical Inference 统计推断
• Statistical Computing 统计计算
• (Generalized) Linear Models 广义线性模型
• Statistical Machine Learning 统计机器学习
• Longitudinal Data Analysis 纵向数据分析
• Foundations of Data Science 数据科学基础

## 经济代写|产业经济学代写Industrial Economics代考|Limits of the Cournot model

We now discuss the question of what relevance our model might have for actual merger policy. Obviously the possible relevance of any simple model is limited. In particular, we are well aware of the limitation of any analysis based on Cournot equilibrium, and we were careful to articulate these limitations in our paper. Nevertheless, we believe our analysis yields several insights that are useful for policy purposes, and we discuss those insights in our paper. In particular, a thorough welfare analysis of a merger should account not only for synergies and for changes in industry output, but also for any redistributions of output among firms with unequal marginal costs.

We see three limitations of our analysis as most significant. First, there is of course nothing to guarantee that firms behave as Cournot competitors. We regard Cournot equilibrium, with its smooth relationship between market concentration and pricecost margins (which seems to mimic the empirical evidence, although this is not entirely clear: see, e.g., Richard Schmalensee, 1989), as a useful simple model of noncooperative oligopolistic rivalry, but clearly competition in practice is not static. Whether or not the Cournot model is helpful for merger policy is very hard to know ex ante: clearly the assumptions are false, but it is much less clear whether they are false in such important ways that the conclusions are misleading. For what it is worth, we remind the reader that our analysis extends readily to conjectural-variations models (Farrell and Shapiro, 1990a, p. 120).

Second, our welfare analysis relies heavily on the assumption of homogeneous products. Even if static quantity-setting behaviour is thought to be a good model of oligopolistic rivalry in a differentiated products industry, a different welfare analysis will be necessary. With differentiated products, typically some consumers will be on the margin of buying one versus another industry product, as well as on the margin of simple quantity-adjustment; moreover, when a consumer switches brands, the quality of the match between consumers and brands is affected.

Third, and most important for policy purposes, the Cournot model ignores the possibility of explicit collusion. As we emphasize in the conclusion to our paper, concern that a merger might facilitate explicit collusion has historically been the driving force behind antitrust policy towards horizontal mergers. Nonetheless, tacit collusion and the danger that a more concentrated market structure will, even without explicit collusion, lead to higher prices are also key concerns in formulating merger policy.

## 经济代写|产业经济学代写Industrial Economics代考|Discussions of an inequality

The bulk of Werden’s comment concerns a key condition from our paper
$$s_I<\sum_{i \in O} \lambda_i s_i$$
Here $s_i$ is firm $i$ ‘s market share of total output, $\lambda_i$ is a measure of firm $i$ ‘s output response to changes in total industry output, $O$ is the set of non-merging firms, $I$ is the set of merging firms, and $s_i \equiv \sum_{i \in I} s_i$ is the combined pre-merger share of the merging parties.

We showed in proposition 5 of our paper that inequality (1), along with some other conditions on demand and cost functions, is sufficient for a price-increasing horizontal merger in Cournot oligopoly to generate positive external benefits (i.e., to benefit consumers and rival firms in the aggregate measured by total economic surplus). Assuming that the merging firms profit from their proposed combination, any merger generating positive external benefits actually raises welfare.

Werden considers only the special example of linear demand and quadratic costs, in which case inequality (1) becomes
$$s_I<\frac{H_o}{\varepsilon} \text {. }$$
Here $\varepsilon$ is the absolute value of the price elasticity of demand at the pre-merger equilibrium, and $H_o \equiv \sum_{i \in O} s_i^2$ is the ‘outsider Herfindahl index’, a modified version of the conventional Herfindahl index of market concentration. Inequality (2) has the attractive property of involving only terms that are relatively amenable to direct measurement.

We noted in our paper that, given the share of the market controlled by the merging parties $\left(s_I\right)$, greater concentration of output among non-merging parties (a larger value of $H_o$ ) would make it easier to satisfy (2) (in the sense that more values of $\varepsilon$ satisfy it) and thus to conclude that the merger enhances welfare. This inference is simply a matter of translating (2) back into words. Yet Werden calls this conclusion ‘a misinterpretation’ of inequality (2). How can this be? The answer is that Werden is conducting a different ‘comparative-static’ exercise than we did. We will try to clarify this fact and will argue that ours is the appropriate exercise.

Our point was simply that, under the assumptions of Cournot behaviour (both before and after the merger), linear demand, and quadratic costs, measuring the elasticity of demand near the pre-merger equilibrium and measuring the firms’ market shares allows one to determine whether (2) is satisfied and thus whether a privately profitable merger necessarily raises welfare. If merger policy were to be based on the Cournot model and the added assumptions of the special case under discussion, then the rule should count higher $H_o$ as a factor favourable to a proposed merger, not (as the current Merger Guidelines (US Department of Justice, 1984) do) as an unfavourable factor. One might well be wary of such a conclusion, based as it is on many special assumptions, but for what it is worth, that is what the model says.

# 产业经济学代考

## 经济代写|产业经济学代写Industrial Economics代考|Discussions of an inequality

Werden 的大部分评论都涉及我们论文中的一个关键条件
$$s_I<\sum_{i \in O} \lambda_i s_i$$

Werden 仅考虑线性需求和二次成本的特殊示例，在这种情况下，不等式 (1) 变为
$$s_I<\frac{H_o}{\varepsilon} .$$

## 有限元方法代写

tatistics-lab作为专业的留学生服务机构，多年来已为美国、英国、加拿大、澳洲等留学热门地的学生提供专业的学术服务，包括但不限于Essay代写，Assignment代写，Dissertation代写，Report代写，小组作业代写，Proposal代写，Paper代写，Presentation代写，计算机作业代写，论文修改和润色，网课代做，exam代考等等。写作范围涵盖高中，本科，研究生等海外留学全阶段，辐射金融，经济学，会计学，审计学，管理学等全球99%专业科目。写作团队既有专业英语母语作者，也有海外名校硕博留学生，每位写作老师都拥有过硬的语言能力，专业的学科背景和学术写作经验。我们承诺100%原创，100%专业，100%准时，100%满意。

## MATLAB代写

MATLAB 是一种用于技术计算的高性能语言。它将计算、可视化和编程集成在一个易于使用的环境中，其中问题和解决方案以熟悉的数学符号表示。典型用途包括：数学和计算算法开发建模、仿真和原型制作数据分析、探索和可视化科学和工程图形应用程序开发，包括图形用户界面构建MATLAB 是一个交互式系统，其基本数据元素是一个不需要维度的数组。这使您可以解决许多技术计算问题，尤其是那些具有矩阵和向量公式的问题，而只需用 C 或 Fortran 等标量非交互式语言编写程序所需的时间的一小部分。MATLAB 名称代表矩阵实验室。MATLAB 最初的编写目的是提供对由 LINPACK 和 EISPACK 项目开发的矩阵软件的轻松访问，这两个项目共同代表了矩阵计算软件的最新技术。MATLAB 经过多年的发展，得到了许多用户的投入。在大学环境中，它是数学、工程和科学入门和高级课程的标准教学工具。在工业领域，MATLAB 是高效研究、开发和分析的首选工具。MATLAB 具有一系列称为工具箱的特定于应用程序的解决方案。对于大多数 MATLAB 用户来说非常重要，工具箱允许您学习应用专业技术。工具箱是 MATLAB 函数（M 文件）的综合集合，可扩展 MATLAB 环境以解决特定类别的问题。可用工具箱的领域包括信号处理、控制系统、神经网络、模糊逻辑、小波、仿真等。

## 经济代写|产业经济学代写Industrial Economics代考|Import quotas in oligopolistic industries

statistics-lab™ 为您的留学生涯保驾护航 在代写产业经济学Industrial Economics方面已经树立了自己的口碑, 保证靠谱, 高质且原创的统计Statistics代写服务。我们的专家在代写产业经济学Industrial Economics代写方面经验极为丰富，各种代写产业经济学Industrial Economics相关的作业也就用不着说。

• Statistical Inference 统计推断
• Statistical Computing 统计计算
• (Generalized) Linear Models 广义线性模型
• Statistical Machine Learning 统计机器学习
• Longitudinal Data Analysis 纵向数据分析
• Foundations of Data Science 数据科学基础

## 经济代写|产业经济学代写Industrial Economics代考|Import quotas in oligopolistic industries

We now show how propositions 4 and 5 illuminate the domestic welfare consequences of quotas when the domestic industry consists of a Cournot oligopoly (plus perhaps a competitive fringe). Thinking of foreign suppliers as the ‘insiders’, we can view a tightening of a quota as a reduction in $X_I$. Moreover, the welfare of outsiders (domestic firms) and consumers is simply domestic welfare. Proposition 4 therefore gives us:
Proposition 7
Consider the effect of an import quota in an industry where domestic firms are Cournot oligopolists, perhaps including a competitive fringe. Slightly tightening the quota raises domestic welfare if and only if the share of imports is less than the $\lambda$-weighted sum of domestic producers’ shares.

Proposition 5 – when its assumptions hold – implies that a small enough import sector should be excluded altogether ${ }^{30}$ Although this would hurt consumers, it would help domestic producers by more. For instance, in the constant-cost, linear-demand case, proposition 5 states that if imports have no more than half the market in Cournot equilibrium, domestic welfare would be greater if imports were completely excluded! To illustrate, take the same model as in the previous subsection: demand is $p=1-X$ and there are two firms (one now foreign), each with zero marginal costs. Domestic welfare in Cournot equilibrium is $2 / 9+1 / 9=1 / 3$. Excluding the foreign firm creates a domestic monopoly, which will produce output of $1 / 2$, yielding (domestic) welfare of $(1 / 8+1 / 4)=3 / 8>1 / 3$.

## 经济代写|产业经济学代写Industrial Economics代考|Policy and externalities

Werden writes that we ‘make the largely unqualified suggestion that current enforcement policy be replaced with an analysis based on the external effects of mergers’ (p. 368-9). We are not sure what he means by ‘largely unqualified’, but we do indeed believe, on general grounds, that an externality-based policy, if feasible, would be desirable.

The very basis of a market economy is to restrict government intervention to the minimum necessary. While economists differ considerably in what they believe to be necessary intervention, almost all would agree that externalities should constitute the main basis for intervention other than income-distribution concerns. Moreover, antitrust (including merger) policy that is not based on the analysis of externalities may prevent efficiency gains that may often outweigh the anticompetitive inefficiencies prevented by the antitrust policy (see Oliver Williamson, 1968). In our view, a serious obstacle facing current merger policy is that the regulators must try to evaluate, from the outside, the likely internal efficiencies resulting from a proposed merger. Because these hard-to-evaluate internal effects must be weighed against other, separately estimated effects, the regulators are obliged to be quite skeptical of claims that efficiencies will result.

We think it would be desirable to be able to identify mergers that do not harm nonparticipants in the aggregate, so that such mergers (like other activities that are on the whole victimless) could be freed from further scrutiny. Perhaps surprisingly, our analysis revealed relatively simple conditions in the Cournot model for a merger to qualify for approval on this basis.

Werden also attacks the working assumption that a proposed merger will be privately beneficial (profitable), by noting some reasons to doubt that firms’ behaviour is always motivated by profit maximization. While this is surely true, he gives no reason to believe that profit maximization is a worse model in merger policy than in any other context in which we use it for policy guidance, nor does he suggest a workable alternative. Certainly, current merger policy relies heavily on the assumption that the merging partners are motivated to maximize their joint profits; we see this assumption as both reasonable and indispensable for policy purposes.

# 产业经济学代考

## 经济代写|产业经济学代写Industrial Economics代考|Policy and externalities

Werden 写道，我们“提出了一个基本无保留的建议，即用基于合并外部影响的分析来取代当前的执法政策”（第 368-9 页）。我们不确定他所说的“基本上不合格”是什么意思，但我们确实相信，基于一般理由，如果可行，基于外部性的政策将是可取的。

Werden 还通过指出一些理由怀疑公司的行为总是以利润最大化为动机来攻击拟议的合并将对私人有利（有利可图）的工作假设。虽然这确实是事实，但他没有理由相信利润最大化是合并政策中比我们将其用于政策指导的任何其他情况下更糟糕的模型，他也没有提出可行的替代方案。当然，当前的合并政策在很大程度上依赖于合并伙伴有动机最大化其共同利润的假设；我们认为这一假设对于政策目的来说既合理又不可或缺。

## 有限元方法代写

tatistics-lab作为专业的留学生服务机构，多年来已为美国、英国、加拿大、澳洲等留学热门地的学生提供专业的学术服务，包括但不限于Essay代写，Assignment代写，Dissertation代写，Report代写，小组作业代写，Proposal代写，Paper代写，Presentation代写，计算机作业代写，论文修改和润色，网课代做，exam代考等等。写作范围涵盖高中，本科，研究生等海外留学全阶段，辐射金融，经济学，会计学，审计学，管理学等全球99%专业科目。写作团队既有专业英语母语作者，也有海外名校硕博留学生，每位写作老师都拥有过硬的语言能力，专业的学科背景和学术写作经验。我们承诺100%原创，100%专业，100%准时，100%满意。

## MATLAB代写

MATLAB 是一种用于技术计算的高性能语言。它将计算、可视化和编程集成在一个易于使用的环境中，其中问题和解决方案以熟悉的数学符号表示。典型用途包括：数学和计算算法开发建模、仿真和原型制作数据分析、探索和可视化科学和工程图形应用程序开发，包括图形用户界面构建MATLAB 是一个交互式系统，其基本数据元素是一个不需要维度的数组。这使您可以解决许多技术计算问题，尤其是那些具有矩阵和向量公式的问题，而只需用 C 或 Fortran 等标量非交互式语言编写程序所需的时间的一小部分。MATLAB 名称代表矩阵实验室。MATLAB 最初的编写目的是提供对由 LINPACK 和 EISPACK 项目开发的矩阵软件的轻松访问，这两个项目共同代表了矩阵计算软件的最新技术。MATLAB 经过多年的发展，得到了许多用户的投入。在大学环境中，它是数学、工程和科学入门和高级课程的标准教学工具。在工业领域，MATLAB 是高效研究、开发和分析的首选工具。MATLAB 具有一系列称为工具箱的特定于应用程序的解决方案。对于大多数 MATLAB 用户来说非常重要，工具箱允许您学习应用专业技术。工具箱是 MATLAB 函数（M 文件）的综合集合，可扩展 MATLAB 环境以解决特定类别的问题。可用工具箱的领域包括信号处理、控制系统、神经网络、模糊逻辑、小波、仿真等。

## HS440 Industrial Economics课程简介

This course will provide students with a survey of economic models in industrial organization, applied to innovation-related issues. The course is divided into three sections. In the first one, we introduce the concept of innovation, its measurement and how it is related to knowledge. In the second part, we look at innovation at the firm level. In particular, we delve into the “knowledge- creating” company and its strategies. Finally, we analyze the structure and evolution of several hi-tech industries, in terms of survival of existing firms and creation of new firms. Prereq: ECON 401 and ECON 402. Writing intensive.

## PREREQUISITES

This course will provide students with an overview of economic models in industrial organization, specifically related to innovation. The course is divided into three sections.

In the first section, students will be introduced to the concept of innovation, including its measurement and how it is related to knowledge. This section will likely cover topics such as the different types of innovation (e.g., product innovation, process innovation, organizational innovation), how innovation is measured (e.g., patents, R&D spending), and the relationship between knowledge creation and innovation.

The second section of the course will focus on innovation at the firm level. Students will learn about the strategies that companies use to create and manage knowledge, with a particular emphasis on the so-called “knowledge-creating” company. This section may also cover topics such as the role of intellectual property rights in innovation, the relationship between innovation and market power, and the impact of innovation on firm performance.

In the final section of the course, students will analyze the structure and evolution of several hi-tech industries. This section will likely include case studies of industries such as biotechnology, software, and telecommunications, and will examine factors such as the survival of existing firms and the creation of new firms in these industries.

Prerequisites for this course include ECON 401 (Microeconomic Theory) and ECON 402 (Market Structure and Pricing). Additionally, this course is writing-intensive, meaning that students will be expected to write multiple papers throughout the semester.

## HS440 Industrial Economics HELP（EXAM HELP， ONLINE TUTOR）

If contracts contain best-price provisions, then under assumptions $1-3:(a)$ any list price above the Cournot price gives some firm an incentive to discount non-selectively; and $(b)$ at the Cournot price some firm has an incenive to discount non-selectively unless all firms are producing their Cournot equilibrium quantities.

Proof We prove the result for (b) first. Consider a set of strictly positive Cournot outputs, $q_i^, i=1, \ldots, n$, defined by $I_i\left(Q^, q_i^\right)=0$, and let $Q^=\sum_i q_i^$. If $q_i$ at the corresponding Cournot price $f\left(Q^\right)$, then $I_i\left(Q^, q_i\right)$ is positive because the $I_i$ function is decreasing in its second argument. Then, to prove part (a) we have by assumption that $\sum_i q_i$. Multiply all firms’ outputs by $\alpha$ and increase $\alpha$ from one to the level $\alpha^$ for which $\sum_i \alpha^* q_i=Q^$. We can easily see from the downward-sloping marginal revenue condition (1) that this will strictly decrease $I_i$ for all $i$. By (b) some firm $j$ will have a non-negative $I_j$ at $\alpha^$, and hence $I_j>0$ at the original outputs.

If assumptions $1-4$ are satisfied and firms’ cost functions are identical, then under bestprice practices, any supracompetitive common list price, $\bar{p}$, that is less than or equal to the Cournot price constitutes a subgame-perfect equilibrium for no-discount strategies $p_{d i}(\bar{p})=\bar{p}_i=\bar{p}$

Proof First, consider the second stage, in which the common list price $\bar{p}$ is at any level between the Cournot and competitive prices. Since costs are symmetric and list-price sales quantities are equal, any unilateral discount to a price that is above the competitive level will be to a price that exceeds other firms’ marginal costs, and hence will be matched when these firms use their contractual option to meet a rival’s price cut and thereby maintain their output quantities. Therefore, a unilateral discount in the second stage from any common list price below the Cournot price will be unprofitable.

In the proposed equilibrium all firms announce the same list price, $\bar{p}$, in the first stage, so that we now consider the profitability of a unilateral deviation from this list price. As noted in section 2, we have modelled the public advance notification process in the first stage as an auction in which firms select list prices $\bar{p}_i, i=1, \ldots, n$, and the lowest preferred list price prevails: $\bar{p}=\min \left{\bar{p}_i, \ldots, \bar{p}_n\right}$. A unilateral increase in list price will not affect $\bar{p}$. A unilateral reduction in the list price by firm $i$ would reduce the prevailing common list price by an equal amount. Under assumption 4 this reduction in the list price would not increase the firm’s market share, $s_i$, which equals $1 / n$, and it follows from the earlier analysis of the second stage that there would be no discounting in the subgame determined by this lower common list price. Hence, a unilateral reduction in $\tilde{p}_i$ is unprofitable if $\left[f(Q) s_I Q_i-c_i\left(s_i Q\right)\right]$ is decreasing in $Q$, or equivalently, if
$$\left.f^{\prime}(Q) s_i Q+s_i f(Q)-s_i c_i^{\prime}\left(s_i Q\right)\right]<0$$

## Textbooks

• An Introduction to Stochastic Modeling, Fourth Edition by Pinsky and Karlin (freely
available through the university library here)
• Essentials of Stochastic Processes, Third Edition by Durrett (freely available through
the university library here)
To reiterate, the textbooks are freely available through the university library. Note that
you must be connected to the university Wi-Fi or VPN to access the ebooks from the library
links. Furthermore, the library links take some time to populate, so do not be alarmed if
the webpage looks bare for a few seconds.

Statistics-lab™可以为您提供ac.in HS440 Industrial Economics产业经济学课程的代写代考辅导服务！ 请认准Statistics-lab™. Statistics-lab™为您的留学生涯保驾护航。

## 经济代写|产业经济学代写Industrial Economics代考|ECON30003

statistics-lab™ 为您的留学生涯保驾护航 在代写产业经济学Industrial Economics方面已经树立了自己的口碑, 保证靠谱, 高质且原创的统计Statistics代写服务。我们的专家在代写产业经济学Industrial Economics代写方面经验极为丰富，各种代写产业经济学Industrial Economics相关的作业也就用不着说。

• Statistical Inference 统计推断
• Statistical Computing 统计计算
• (Generalized) Linear Models 广义线性模型
• Statistical Machine Learning 统计机器学习
• Longitudinal Data Analysis 纵向数据分析
• Foundations of Data Science 数据科学基础

## 经济代写|产业经济学代写Industrial Economics代考|The relationships between targets and instruments

The simplest mechanism for influencing the quantity and quality of retailing resources is to specify contractually the conditions under which the product is to be sold. This is often not enough, however: no Court will adjudicate on the attractiveness or helpfulness of sales assistants; no individual retailer has control over the total number of retail outlets. Resale price maintenance, territorial exclusivity, and selective distribution can all be used to give incentives to increase the resources devoted to retailing a particular product.

Opportunism is made possible by the existence of asset specificity and sunk costs on one side of the relationship and is discouraged by increasing them on the other. Exclusive dealing relationships and territorial exclusivity are both means of increasing the commitment of the two parties to the relationship. Raising the other party’s sunk costs has the same effect.

One way of securing bias is to build it into the terms and conditions of supply – a stockist of my washing machines may be required to devote a certain amount of space to their display. Bias is intrinsic to an exclusive dealing arrangement. The most valuable bias, however, is that provided by a retailer who appears to be independent. Override commissions to travel agents or insurance brokers may achieve this. So may direct payment for promotion of the product. (These are more usually made indirectly through the provision of cheap loans or equipment.)

Market segmentation may be defended by contractual prohibitions on arbitrage, while resale price maintenance may make arbitrage unprofitable. Exclusive dealing arrangements increase search and switching costs for consumers, and may also raise switching costs for retailers, since they tend to increase the extent to which assets are specific to a particular manufacturer. Non-linear price schedules make alternative sourcing on a small scale expensive. Increasing sunk costs which are specific to a particular producer directly increases the costs to retailers of switching supplier. All these devices also have the effect of creating obstacles to new entry.

Vertical restraints can most effectively be used to extend monopoly through a form of exclusive dealing: purchase of the monopoly product is conditional on buying the competitive products from the same supplier. Alternatively, the competitive and monopoly products are often combined in a single bundle.

The matrix of relationships between targets and instruments is shown in table 14.1. The lists are not exhaustive: nor are the entries in the cells of the matrix complete. But the structure illustrates why vertical restraints pose a general problem for competition policy. Some of the objectives of vertical restraints are essentially benign. In respect of the manufacturer’s interest in the absolute conditions of product sale, for example, it is difficult to detect any divergence between the interests of consumers and producers. The situation is, however, very different when measures to discourage entry are concerned. But the difficulty is that there is no one to one mapping between targets and instruments. The same mechanism may serve both innocuous and anticompetitive ends. It follows from this that rules which are based on the form of a particular restraint are likely to be inadequate. Nor is it possible, or sensible, to look at intent: since there are several purposes to any particular action, there is no reason why even a frank respondent should be clear about the relative contributions of his different motives. That requires that public policy should undertake a cost-benefit analysis of the consequences of any particular restraint: but is it realistic to expect that the antitrust authorities will make an assessment of a rule such as McDonald’s hamburgers must be sold under golden arches?

## 经济代写|产业经济学代写Industrial Economics代考|The legality of vertical restraints

The basic legal principle is that the Courts will enforce a valid contract. It follows that if the conditions of sale include a vertical restraint, then that restraint binds the purchaser. Exceptionally, the law may make certain restraints ineffective by express provision. This is common, for example, where the manufacturer seeks to escape liability to purchasers of defective products. A seller may also require the purchaser to impose conditions on subsequent purchasers – as is true of the restriction on rebinding books. Transfers of land may often be subject to irrelevant or onerous conditions which were imposed for the first time in transactions which occurred many centuries ago.

Vertical restraints imposed within the European Community fall under the scope of Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome. Article 85 prohibits an agreement between undertakings which restricts or distorts competition and has an effect on trade between member states. Article $85(3)$ provides, however, for the exemption of agreements which are of economic benefit. This provision has been used by the Commission to grant block exemption for certain important categories of vertical restraint, particularly the selective distribution agreements between motor manufacturers and their franchisees and the exclusive dealing arrangements between the suppliers of beer and petrol and their retailers.

A vertical restraint may also be an abuse of a dominant position in terms of Article 86. There is no equivalent provision for exemption from Article 86 , and Article 86 has been applied against a range of vertical restrictions, including territorial exclusivity (Grundig), incentive schemes for dealers (Michelin Tyres) and aggregated rebates (Hoffman la Roche).

Some Community states also have domestic legislation which bears on – at least some – kinds of vertical restraint. In the UK, resale price maintenance is generally illegal. Policy towards other forms of restriction broadly follows the European model. A vertical restraint is likely to be an anticompetitive practice in terms of the 1980 Competition Act, which means that if it is found, after investigation by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission, to be against the public interest, it can be prohibited. Raleigh’s refusal to supply bicycles other than through specialist retailers fell under these provisions. If they are undertaken by a firm or groups of firms who occupy a monopoly position, vertical restraints may be the subject of specific recommendation following an investigation by the $\mathrm{MMC}$ of the industry as a whole. This was the basis of the recent recommendations made (but not substantially implemented) for loosening the ties between breweries and public houses. The German position is similar. Section 15 of the Restraint of Competition Act (GWB) imposes a general prohibition of resale price maintenance. There are no per se rules about other vertical restraints, but section 18 allows the Cartel Office to declare specific practices illegal.

# 产业经济学代考

## 有限元方法代写

tatistics-lab作为专业的留学生服务机构，多年来已为美国、英国、加拿大、澳洲等留学热门地的学生提供专业的学术服务，包括但不限于Essay代写，Assignment代写，Dissertation代写，Report代写，小组作业代写，Proposal代写，Paper代写，Presentation代写，计算机作业代写，论文修改和润色，网课代做，exam代考等等。写作范围涵盖高中，本科，研究生等海外留学全阶段，辐射金融，经济学，会计学，审计学，管理学等全球99%专业科目。写作团队既有专业英语母语作者，也有海外名校硕博留学生，每位写作老师都拥有过硬的语言能力，专业的学科背景和学术写作经验。我们承诺100%原创，100%专业，100%准时，100%满意。

## MATLAB代写

MATLAB 是一种用于技术计算的高性能语言。它将计算、可视化和编程集成在一个易于使用的环境中，其中问题和解决方案以熟悉的数学符号表示。典型用途包括：数学和计算算法开发建模、仿真和原型制作数据分析、探索和可视化科学和工程图形应用程序开发，包括图形用户界面构建MATLAB 是一个交互式系统，其基本数据元素是一个不需要维度的数组。这使您可以解决许多技术计算问题，尤其是那些具有矩阵和向量公式的问题，而只需用 C 或 Fortran 等标量非交互式语言编写程序所需的时间的一小部分。MATLAB 名称代表矩阵实验室。MATLAB 最初的编写目的是提供对由 LINPACK 和 EISPACK 项目开发的矩阵软件的轻松访问，这两个项目共同代表了矩阵计算软件的最新技术。MATLAB 经过多年的发展，得到了许多用户的投入。在大学环境中，它是数学、工程和科学入门和高级课程的标准教学工具。在工业领域，MATLAB 是高效研究、开发和分析的首选工具。MATLAB 具有一系列称为工具箱的特定于应用程序的解决方案。对于大多数 MATLAB 用户来说非常重要，工具箱允许您学习应用专业技术。工具箱是 MATLAB 函数（M 文件）的综合集合，可扩展 MATLAB 环境以解决特定类别的问题。可用工具箱的领域包括信号处理、控制系统、神经网络、模糊逻辑、小波、仿真等。

## 经济代写|产业经济学代写Industrial Economics代考|ECON7001

statistics-lab™ 为您的留学生涯保驾护航 在代写产业经济学Industrial Economics方面已经树立了自己的口碑, 保证靠谱, 高质且原创的统计Statistics代写服务。我们的专家在代写产业经济学Industrial Economics代写方面经验极为丰富，各种代写产业经济学Industrial Economics相关的作业也就用不着说。

• Statistical Inference 统计推断
• Statistical Computing 统计计算
• (Generalized) Linear Models 广义线性模型
• Statistical Machine Learning 统计机器学习
• Longitudinal Data Analysis 纵向数据分析
• Foundations of Data Science 数据科学基础

## 经济代写|产业经济学代写Industrial Economics代考|The meaning of vertical restraints

A vertical restraint is a restriction imposed by manufacturers or wholesalers on those to whom they sell their products. We are subject to such restraints more often than we think. The publishers of most books sold in the UK attempt to impose three vertical restraints. One is a requirement that ‘no part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without permission’. It limits the use which the owner may make of the book he has purchased: he may not reproduce or transmit it in any form or by any means.

Another is that the book is sold subject to the standard conditions of the Net Book Agreement. The most important of these conditions prohibits a retailer from selling the book at a price other than that fixed by the publisher. Books are one of the small number of commodities which may legally be subject to this resale price maintenance, as a result of a ruling in 1962 that the net book agreement – an agreement registered under the Restrictive Practices Act – was in the public interest. ${ }^1$

A third restraint prohibits the purchaser from rebinding the paperback edition in hard covers. The price difference between the paperback and hardback editions exceeds the cost of binding. In producing two versions of the same book, the publisher hopes to segment the library market – in which he believes demand is inelastic – from sales to individuals. The restriction is designed to limit arbitrage between these two markets.

Each of these vertical restraints is patently anticompetitive in its intention and effects. The first is designed to prevent other publishers from producing the same book at a lower price – it aims to establish a barrier to entry. The second seeks to limit competition between retailers. The third is intended to support the segmentation of the market and associated price discrimination by the publisher. These objectives entry prevention, limitation of retail competition, and market segmentation – are typical of vertical restraints.

Yet it is apparent that a case can be made that each of these restrictions is of public benefit. If other publishers and readers were free to Xerox books at will, sales would be reduced and publishers would find it difficult to recover the fixed costs of typesetting and royalties to authors which their competitors would not have to incur. Resale price maintenance is harder to defend, but representatives of the Publishers Association succeeded in persuading a sceptical court of senior judges that it was in the public interest. Price discrimination permits books to be published, and made available in student editions, which might otherwise never see the light of day, or otherwise be available only to very few readers. Defer judgement on the merits of these arguments for the moment: note only that they can be made. It is the possibility that vertical restraints can be both restrictive of competition and of general benefit, that has made policy towards them such a difficult issue.

## 经济代写|产业经济学代写Industrial Economics代考|Attitudes to vertical restraints

Competition policy has tended to view vertical restraints with considerable suspicion. Several of the landmark cases in the evolution of the antitrust policy of the European Community have been concerned with vertical restraints – such as the incentives offered by Michelin Tyres to its distributors, the aggregated rebate scheme used by Hoffman la Roche to sell its vitamins, territorial restrictions on the sale of Grundig appliances, and the control by United Brands of the European banana market. However, a number of important classes of restraint have secured the block exemption available under Article $85(3)$ from the provisions of the Treaty.

In the US too, vertical restraints have been a principal concern of the competition authorities. In the last fifteen years, however, the interpretation of American antitrust law has undergone major changes and in no area has this change been as radical as in the judicial approach to vertical restraints. Broadly, the Justice Department will now not normally challenge a vertical restraint and a private plaintiff is unlikely to be able to do so with much hope of success. William Baxter – an assistant Attorney General in charge of antitrust policy in the Reagan administration, who both symbolized and was partly responsible for this shift in stance – has been quoted as saying ‘In my view, there is no such thing as a vertical “problem” …. The only possible adverse competitive consequences of vertical arrangements are in their horizontal effects’ (Howard, 1983).

This shift in opinion is the result partly of a general change in intellectual climate.

However, a group associated with the University of Chicago $^2$ has been particularly influential, both through articles and books, and as a result of testimony in particular cases. Their approach begins by noting that the principal interest which the manufacturer of a product has in the conditions under which it is sold is that they should be such as to maximize his sales. This is not often achieved by limiting retail competition. It follows that although vertical restraints may often be anticompetitive in appearance, in some more fundamental sense they facilitate the operation of the competitive process.

Thus if – to take an extreme case – I am a wholesaler or manufacturer of perfume, the environment in which my product is sold is a matter of prime importance. I am selling magic, not simply smells, and magic is not available in discount stores or at cut prices. I therefore insist that my perfume is sold only by attractive sales assistants in luxurious surroundings and if $\mathrm{I}$ facilitate its sale at reduced prices at all, it is only in airport shops where the customer believes (erroneously) that the low price is the result of reduced taxes rather than reduced margins.

Now this view may be mistaken. Purchasers of perfume may be as hard-nosed as purchasers of potatoes and base their choices on a careful assessment of value for money. In that case my strategy will be less profitable than one which does not include vertical restraints. But that is a matter for my commercial judgement and it is no more sensible or reasonable for the competition authorities to insist that I sell my perfume through Woolworths than it is appropriate for them to prescribe the ingredients from which it should be manufactured or the way in which it should be packaged or advertised.

# 产业经济学代考

## 有限元方法代写

tatistics-lab作为专业的留学生服务机构，多年来已为美国、英国、加拿大、澳洲等留学热门地的学生提供专业的学术服务，包括但不限于Essay代写，Assignment代写，Dissertation代写，Report代写，小组作业代写，Proposal代写，Paper代写，Presentation代写，计算机作业代写，论文修改和润色，网课代做，exam代考等等。写作范围涵盖高中，本科，研究生等海外留学全阶段，辐射金融，经济学，会计学，审计学，管理学等全球99%专业科目。写作团队既有专业英语母语作者，也有海外名校硕博留学生，每位写作老师都拥有过硬的语言能力，专业的学科背景和学术写作经验。我们承诺100%原创，100%专业，100%准时，100%满意。

## MATLAB代写

MATLAB 是一种用于技术计算的高性能语言。它将计算、可视化和编程集成在一个易于使用的环境中，其中问题和解决方案以熟悉的数学符号表示。典型用途包括：数学和计算算法开发建模、仿真和原型制作数据分析、探索和可视化科学和工程图形应用程序开发，包括图形用户界面构建MATLAB 是一个交互式系统，其基本数据元素是一个不需要维度的数组。这使您可以解决许多技术计算问题，尤其是那些具有矩阵和向量公式的问题，而只需用 C 或 Fortran 等标量非交互式语言编写程序所需的时间的一小部分。MATLAB 名称代表矩阵实验室。MATLAB 最初的编写目的是提供对由 LINPACK 和 EISPACK 项目开发的矩阵软件的轻松访问，这两个项目共同代表了矩阵计算软件的最新技术。MATLAB 经过多年的发展，得到了许多用户的投入。在大学环境中，它是数学、工程和科学入门和高级课程的标准教学工具。在工业领域，MATLAB 是高效研究、开发和分析的首选工具。MATLAB 具有一系列称为工具箱的特定于应用程序的解决方案。对于大多数 MATLAB 用户来说非常重要，工具箱允许您学习应用专业技术。工具箱是 MATLAB 函数（M 文件）的综合集合，可扩展 MATLAB 环境以解决特定类别的问题。可用工具箱的领域包括信号处理、控制系统、神经网络、模糊逻辑、小波、仿真等。

## 经济代写|产业经济学代写Industrial Economics代考|ECON4438

statistics-lab™ 为您的留学生涯保驾护航 在代写产业经济学Industrial Economics方面已经树立了自己的口碑, 保证靠谱, 高质且原创的统计Statistics代写服务。我们的专家在代写产业经济学Industrial Economics代写方面经验极为丰富，各种代写产业经济学Industrial Economics相关的作业也就用不着说。

• Statistical Inference 统计推断
• Statistical Computing 统计计算
• (Generalized) Linear Models 广义线性模型
• Statistical Machine Learning 统计机器学习
• Longitudinal Data Analysis 纵向数据分析
• Foundations of Data Science 数据科学基础

## 经济代写|产业经济学代写Industrial Economics代考|Conclusions and extensions

The observed price differences in the European car market have been puzzling to many economists and policy makers. In this article I have used an oligopoly model to analyse to what extent the presence of international price discrimination, as measured by cross-country differences in relative wholesale markups, can explain the puzzle. Three sources for international price discrimination are considered: cross-country differences in price elasticities, differences in quota regimes, and differences in the degree of collusive behaviour. My empirical results establish the presence of international price discrimination. Large differences in price elasticities are estimated, indicating the presence of domestic market power. The domestic firms in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and especially Italy tend to face much lower ownprice elasticities than the foreign firms. Significantly binding quota constraints on Japanese firms are found in France and Italy. The possible presence of collusive behaviour cannot be rejected for Germany and the United Kingdom. The empirical results are encouraging and suggest two specific topics for further research on price differences in the European car market. ${ }^{34}$

The collection of additional data could generate additional insights in our understanding of the price differences. Collecting detailed data on country-specific dealer margins and dealer discounts and on country-specific demographics is a first important way to proceed. In addition, it would be desirable to collect data over a longer time horizon, say the period 1970-95. Several facts indicate that this period has been far from stable. A detailed analysis would provide a good test for the robustness of the empirical results. The descriptive studies mentioned in the Introduction suggest a gradual increase in the cross-country price differences during the 1970s and early 1980s, followed by a decrease (Mertens, 1990). During the same period there have been large exchange-rate fluctuations, which producers may or may not have passed through to consumers. A detailed analysis of the exchange-rate-pass-through relationship would be desirable to better understand some of the short-term price differences across countries. See Knetter (1993) for some first results on exchange rate pass-through in the car market. Furthermore, there has been a continuous decline of the domestic market shares in several European countries (see, e.g., de Melo and Messerlin, 1988). This suggests a gradual decline in domestic market power (as implied by the price elasticities). Moreover, the import quota constraints were introduced in the late 1970s and will only be removed at the end of the century. Finally, the European Commission has taken several measures to better integrate the EC car market and lower crossborder arbitrage costs. Though the deadline for integration was 1992 , many of these measures took effect afterward, e.g., the tax harmonization and the uniform set of technical requirements in 1993. The selective and exclusive distribution system, limiting cross-border arbitrage, is an arrangement for the period 1985-95, but it has been renewed for another ten years, with some additional specifications to facilitate cross-border trade.

## 经济代写|产业经济学代写Industrial Economics代考|The Model

The game that is described in this section is non-cooperative. Overt collusion is ruled out because, at least in North America, binding agreements on price or output are illegal. Nevertheless, when a game is’ repeated many times, solutions that have a collusive flavour can emerge.

In a companion paper (Slade, 1989) I derive a method of generating price wars in supergame models. The market considered is one where oligopolists produce a differentiated product and use price as a strategic variable. Prices are posted and can be observed by all. In addition, rival sales can be monitored. There is thus little uncertainty or scope for secret price cutting. ${ }^1$ Nevertheless, price wars occur. Many real-world markets which are plagued by price wars fit this description – retail gasoline and airline-seat sales are just two examples.

In the Slade model, price wars are information-gathering devices. Demand is subject to periodic but infrequent random shifts. After a demand shift has occurred, unless firms change prices they cannot know the new demand conditions. Incentives are such that considerable price cutting and undercutting occurs before the market settles down to the new equilibrium.

The method of generating price wars is illustrated with two examples. Example 1 involves discontinuous or ‘grim’ strategies in the spirit of Friedman (1971). With a grim strategy, punishment for any deviation from the collusive outcome involves reversion to Nash behaviour for the one-shot game. Example 2 uses continuous strategies as in Kalai and Stanford (1985). With a continuous strategy, small defections trigger small punishments and large defections trigger large punishments. The price-war dynamics inherent in the two examples have much in common. There are, however, testable differences as described below.

# 产业经济学代考

## 有限元方法代写

tatistics-lab作为专业的留学生服务机构，多年来已为美国、英国、加拿大、澳洲等留学热门地的学生提供专业的学术服务，包括但不限于Essay代写，Assignment代写，Dissertation代写，Report代写，小组作业代写，Proposal代写，Paper代写，Presentation代写，计算机作业代写，论文修改和润色，网课代做，exam代考等等。写作范围涵盖高中，本科，研究生等海外留学全阶段，辐射金融，经济学，会计学，审计学，管理学等全球99%专业科目。写作团队既有专业英语母语作者，也有海外名校硕博留学生，每位写作老师都拥有过硬的语言能力，专业的学科背景和学术写作经验。我们承诺100%原创，100%专业，100%准时，100%满意。

## MATLAB代写

MATLAB 是一种用于技术计算的高性能语言。它将计算、可视化和编程集成在一个易于使用的环境中，其中问题和解决方案以熟悉的数学符号表示。典型用途包括：数学和计算算法开发建模、仿真和原型制作数据分析、探索和可视化科学和工程图形应用程序开发，包括图形用户界面构建MATLAB 是一个交互式系统，其基本数据元素是一个不需要维度的数组。这使您可以解决许多技术计算问题，尤其是那些具有矩阵和向量公式的问题，而只需用 C 或 Fortran 等标量非交互式语言编写程序所需的时间的一小部分。MATLAB 名称代表矩阵实验室。MATLAB 最初的编写目的是提供对由 LINPACK 和 EISPACK 项目开发的矩阵软件的轻松访问，这两个项目共同代表了矩阵计算软件的最新技术。MATLAB 经过多年的发展，得到了许多用户的投入。在大学环境中，它是数学、工程和科学入门和高级课程的标准教学工具。在工业领域，MATLAB 是高效研究、开发和分析的首选工具。MATLAB 具有一系列称为工具箱的特定于应用程序的解决方案。对于大多数 MATLAB 用户来说非常重要，工具箱允许您学习应用专业技术。工具箱是 MATLAB 函数（M 文件）的综合集合，可扩展 MATLAB 环境以解决特定类别的问题。可用工具箱的领域包括信号处理、控制系统、神经网络、模糊逻辑、小波、仿真等。

## 经济代写|产业经济学代写Industrial Economics代考|ECON7400

statistics-lab™ 为您的留学生涯保驾护航 在代写产业经济学Industrial Economics方面已经树立了自己的口碑, 保证靠谱, 高质且原创的统计Statistics代写服务。我们的专家在代写产业经济学Industrial Economics代写方面经验极为丰富，各种代写产业经济学Industrial Economics相关的作业也就用不着说。

• Statistical Inference 统计推断
• Statistical Computing 统计计算
• (Generalized) Linear Models 广义线性模型
• Statistical Machine Learning 统计机器学习
• Longitudinal Data Analysis 纵向数据分析
• Foundations of Data Science 数据科学基础

## 经济代写|产业经济学代写Industrial Economics代考|Empirical results

Groups are defined according to their class (with one of the groups being the outside good), and subgroups according to their country of origin, foreign or domestic. I used the quasi-likelihood ratio test of Gallant and Jorgenson (1979) to test for several alternative specifications of the nested logit model, all of which were rejected at traditional 5 per cent significance levels, as discussed in detail in Verboven (1994). First, the data rejected the special cases of both the competitive, hedonic pricing model with zero markups, and the simple logit model with non-localized competition $\left(\sigma_1=\sigma_2=0\right)$. Second, the data rejected a more sophisticated version of the nested logit model, with an extra nest indicating whether to buy a car from a ‘high’ category (collecting the three highest classes) or a ‘low’ category (collecting the three lowest classes). Third, the data rejected a version of the nested logit model with an extra nest (at the top of the tree) indicating whether to buy the outside good or a car from one of the other classes. ${ }^{26}$ Fourth, the data rejected an alternative ordering of the nesting structure, in which groups are defined according to country of origin and subgroups according to class. This specification led to an estimate of $\sigma_1$ significantly below $\sigma_2$, an undesirable result in terms of McFadden’s random utility maximization. These various rejections are roughly consistent with Goldberg (1995), who uses micro-level data on the US car market. I also estimated a specification in which cars belonging to the same subgroup behave as a collusive coalition. This specification was rejected by the data at a 10 per cent significance level.

Table 10.2 presents the estimates of the pricing and the demand equation for the unrejected specification of the nested logit in which groups correspond to class and subgroups to country of origin (domestic or foreign). Consider first the estimated coefficients appearing only in the demand equation and not in the pricing equation. Recall that the coefficients on the technical characteristics may be interpreted as elasticities. The elasticity of both horsepower and width have the expected sign and are estimated precisely. Demand is especially elastic with respect to width. Weight and height enter demand insignificantly. This may be explained by the fact that weight and height have an ambiguous impact on their underlying performance variables: weight increases safety but reduces speed/acceleration; height increases size/comfort but decreases speed/acceleration. The significant variables horsepower and width do not have such an ambiguous impact. Country of origin seems to be an important differentiating physical characteristic. Interpreting the country-of-origin variables as capturing differences in taste, consumers have a high preference for German cars, a lower preference for French and European-built US cars, and the lowest preference for UK, Italian, Japanese, and other (mainly East European) cars. To compare the ‘net country-of-origin’ effect in a given country, one has to add the foreign firm disadvantage effect where appropriate. In France, for example, it may be verified that consumers tend to prefer French cars to German cars once the foreign firm disadvantage effect is taken into account. Of course, as argued in the discussion of the data, the country-of-origin variables may capture not only direct taste differences, but also systematic demand-reducing trade restrictions against certain countries.

## 经济代写|产业经济学代写Industrial Economics代考|Unexplained price differences

The above results established the presence of international price discrimination as measured by cross-country differences in relative wholesale markups. Price differences that do not follow from differences in markups are captured by the market-specific fixed effects, to be interpreted relative to Belgium. Note that these fixed effects are substantially smaller than the fixed effects of the hedonic specification (as implied by the hedonic price index in table 10.1 and the formula for each index number, i.e., $p_m=\exp \left(\omega_m\right)$ ). The interpretation of the drops in the fixed effects, relative to Belgium, is intuitive and illuminating. Recall that the hedonic specification may be interpreted as the special case of perfect competition with zero markups. The fixed effects in the hedonic specification then took over the effect of an ‘omitted’ markup variable: as shown above, the estimated markups are relatively high in all countries, as compared with Belgium.

Despite their drop, the estimates of the fixed effects for Germany and especially the United Kingdom remain quite large, relative to Belgium. The data reject the restricted model without further effects in the pricing equation at a high significance level. Although the fixed effects have a broad economic interpretation of capturing both systematic differences in the marginal cost of operating in the various countries (through $\omega_m$ ) and systematic differences in percentage deviations of the wholesale price, $p_{j m}^w$ from the consumer list price, $p_{j m}$ (through $\tau_m$ ) I find them quite substantial; they deserve a more detailed analysis.

A first potential explanation for the significant estimates of the fixed effects may be the imperfect specification of the price elasticities as implied by the nested logit model. As explained above, the price elasticities are an important explanation of crosscountry price differences through their effect on markups. If these elasticities are badly specified, they may not explain the cross-country price differences very well, so that the fixed effects may (partly) take over their role. This was especially the case for the (rejected) hedonic specification with its perfect competition interpretation, for the (rejected) simple logit specification with its non-localized competition, and for the (rejected) version of the nested logit model with the reverse nesting structure. Similarly, a more sophisticated model than the present nested logit model, perhaps Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes’ (1995) or Feenstra and Levinsohn’s (1995) model of product differentiation, could capture the price elasticities even better and generate less-significant estimates of the fixed effects.

## 有限元方法代写

tatistics-lab作为专业的留学生服务机构，多年来已为美国、英国、加拿大、澳洲等留学热门地的学生提供专业的学术服务，包括但不限于Essay代写，Assignment代写，Dissertation代写，Report代写，小组作业代写，Proposal代写，Paper代写，Presentation代写，计算机作业代写，论文修改和润色，网课代做，exam代考等等。写作范围涵盖高中，本科，研究生等海外留学全阶段，辐射金融，经济学，会计学，审计学，管理学等全球99%专业科目。写作团队既有专业英语母语作者，也有海外名校硕博留学生，每位写作老师都拥有过硬的语言能力，专业的学科背景和学术写作经验。我们承诺100%原创，100%专业，100%准时，100%满意。

## MATLAB代写

MATLAB 是一种用于技术计算的高性能语言。它将计算、可视化和编程集成在一个易于使用的环境中，其中问题和解决方案以熟悉的数学符号表示。典型用途包括：数学和计算算法开发建模、仿真和原型制作数据分析、探索和可视化科学和工程图形应用程序开发，包括图形用户界面构建MATLAB 是一个交互式系统，其基本数据元素是一个不需要维度的数组。这使您可以解决许多技术计算问题，尤其是那些具有矩阵和向量公式的问题，而只需用 C 或 Fortran 等标量非交互式语言编写程序所需的时间的一小部分。MATLAB 名称代表矩阵实验室。MATLAB 最初的编写目的是提供对由 LINPACK 和 EISPACK 项目开发的矩阵软件的轻松访问，这两个项目共同代表了矩阵计算软件的最新技术。MATLAB 经过多年的发展，得到了许多用户的投入。在大学环境中，它是数学、工程和科学入门和高级课程的标准教学工具。在工业领域，MATLAB 是高效研究、开发和分析的首选工具。MATLAB 具有一系列称为工具箱的特定于应用程序的解决方案。对于大多数 MATLAB 用户来说非常重要，工具箱允许您学习应用专业技术。工具箱是 MATLAB 函数（M 文件）的综合集合，可扩展 MATLAB 环境以解决特定类别的问题。可用工具箱的领域包括信号处理、控制系统、神经网络、模糊逻辑、小波、仿真等。

## 经济代写|产业经济学代写Industrial Economics代考|ECON3400

statistics-lab™ 为您的留学生涯保驾护航 在代写产业经济学Industrial Economics方面已经树立了自己的口碑, 保证靠谱, 高质且原创的统计Statistics代写服务。我们的专家在代写产业经济学Industrial Economics代写方面经验极为丰富，各种代写产业经济学Industrial Economics相关的作业也就用不着说。

• Statistical Inference 统计推断
• Statistical Computing 统计计算
• (Generalized) Linear Models 广义线性模型
• Statistical Machine Learning 统计机器学习
• Longitudinal Data Analysis 纵向数据分析
• Foundations of Data Science 数据科学基础

## 经济代写|产业经济学代写Industrial Economics代考|Product differentiation and the pricing of varieties

Consider consumers distributed uniformly over the unit circle with firms 1 and 2 in arbitrary locations, the shortest arc distance between them being $s$ (that is $s \leq 1 / 2$ ). In figure 7.6, firm 1 is located at $x=0$ and firm 2 at $x=s$. Suppose that firms have no production costs and that transportation costs are quadratic with coefficient $t$ and no linear term. (As explained in section 1, here transportation costs will be the costs associated with transforming a base product into a variety or specialized product.)

In the situation we have in mind each firm produces a base product, corresponding to its location in product space (the circle), and at the first stage it has to decide whether to (potentially) offer the whole array of varieties and price discriminate or just to offer the base product and therefore to price uniformly. In the latter case the supply of specialized varieties is left to outside independent producers which, we will assume, price competitively at cost. In any case, we assume that the costs of redesigning the base product increase quadratically with the distance at which the variety chosen is located. The first-stage choice could also be interpreted as a decision as whether to integrate forward or not. The base product could be a base chemical or steel and the varieties the specialized chemicals or steels. Whatever the interpretation, if a firm chooses to produce only the base product, then it will choose a uniform price, and if it chooses to offer the array of varieties, it will choose a price schedule when the market stage comes. As before we assume that in the mixed cases $(U, D)$ or $(D, U)$ the firm that prices uniformly moves first and therefore figure $7.2$ represents the game tree of our game. This may come about because this firm may need to advertise its price in order to get any sales (put advertisements in the newspapers, for example), whereas the price-discriminating firm may just announce that it will meet the competition (in any case to announce the whole price schedule in an intelligible way may be too complex and costly due to the large number of varieties).

## 经济代写|产业经济学代写Industrial Economics代考|Concluding remarks

We have examined the implications of letting firms choose their price policy in the context of a spatial competition model with given locations for firms. Either firms choose simultaneously price policy and actual prices, or firms may commit to a certain policy (uniform pricing) before the actual price competition takes place. The general conclusion is that there is a robust tendency for a firm to choose the discriminatory policy since it is more flexible and does better against any generic strategy of the rival, although, as we have seen in the models of section 3, firms may end up worse off than if they choose to price uniformly.

Furthermore, in those models, prices that consumers paid under uniform pricing were higher than under discriminatory pricing. This is not totally surprising: denying a firm the right to meet the price of a competitor on a discriminatory basis provides the latter with some protection against price attacks. The effect is then to weaken competition, contrary to the belief of the proponents of naive application of legislation prohibiting price discrimination like the Robinson-Patman Act in the United States, or similar recommendations of the Price Commission in the United Kingdom. Actually, as observed by Hoover:

The difference between market competition under FOB pricing (with strictly delineated market areas) and under discriminatory delivered pricing is something like the difference between trench warfare and guerrilla warfare. In the former case all the fighting takes place along a definite battle line; in the second case the opposing forces are intermingled over a broad area. (1948, p. 57)

Our results are short-run results since both the location and the number of firms are given. We know that the choice of a particular price policy leads to different long-run equilibrium patterns (see, for example, Greenhut et al., 1987, part III). When policy and prices are chosen simultaneously, Proposition 1 (that can be generalized to the case of any number of firms) indicates that, at the long-run equilibrium, firms will choose to price discriminate in the absence of institutional constraints. Thus, at the long-run equilibrium, uniform pricing would not be observed. Lederer and Hurter (1986) have shown that, with perfectly inelastic demand, two price-discriminating firms will locate in order to minimize total transportation costs.

.

## 有限元方法代写

tatistics-lab作为专业的留学生服务机构，多年来已为美国、英国、加拿大、澳洲等留学热门地的学生提供专业的学术服务，包括但不限于Essay代写，Assignment代写，Dissertation代写，Report代写，小组作业代写，Proposal代写，Paper代写，Presentation代写，计算机作业代写，论文修改和润色，网课代做，exam代考等等。写作范围涵盖高中，本科，研究生等海外留学全阶段，辐射金融，经济学，会计学，审计学，管理学等全球99%专业科目。写作团队既有专业英语母语作者，也有海外名校硕博留学生，每位写作老师都拥有过硬的语言能力，专业的学科背景和学术写作经验。我们承诺100%原创，100%专业，100%准时，100%满意。

## MATLAB代写

MATLAB 是一种用于技术计算的高性能语言。它将计算、可视化和编程集成在一个易于使用的环境中，其中问题和解决方案以熟悉的数学符号表示。典型用途包括：数学和计算算法开发建模、仿真和原型制作数据分析、探索和可视化科学和工程图形应用程序开发，包括图形用户界面构建MATLAB 是一个交互式系统，其基本数据元素是一个不需要维度的数组。这使您可以解决许多技术计算问题，尤其是那些具有矩阵和向量公式的问题，而只需用 C 或 Fortran 等标量非交互式语言编写程序所需的时间的一小部分。MATLAB 名称代表矩阵实验室。MATLAB 最初的编写目的是提供对由 LINPACK 和 EISPACK 项目开发的矩阵软件的轻松访问，这两个项目共同代表了矩阵计算软件的最新技术。MATLAB 经过多年的发展，得到了许多用户的投入。在大学环境中，它是数学、工程和科学入门和高级课程的标准教学工具。在工业领域，MATLAB 是高效研究、开发和分析的首选工具。MATLAB 具有一系列称为工具箱的特定于应用程序的解决方案。对于大多数 MATLAB 用户来说非常重要，工具箱允许您学习应用专业技术。工具箱是 MATLAB 函数（M 文件）的综合集合，可扩展 MATLAB 环境以解决特定类别的问题。可用工具箱的领域包括信号处理、控制系统、神经网络、模糊逻辑、小波、仿真等。

## 经济代写|产业经济学代写Industrial Economics代考|ECON3516

statistics-lab™ 为您的留学生涯保驾护航 在代写产业经济学Industrial Economics方面已经树立了自己的口碑, 保证靠谱, 高质且原创的统计Statistics代写服务。我们的专家在代写产业经济学Industrial Economics代写方面经验极为丰富，各种代写产业经济学Industrial Economics相关的作业也就用不着说。

• Statistical Inference 统计推断
• Statistical Computing 统计计算
• (Generalized) Linear Models 广义线性模型
• Statistical Machine Learning 统计机器学习
• Longitudinal Data Analysis 纵向数据分析
• Foundations of Data Science 数据科学基础

## 经济代写|产业经济学代写Industrial Economics代考|Commitment to a price policy

In this section we consider two-stage games in which firms may commit to a particular price policy, uniform pricing $(U)$, or may not commit at all and stay free to choose an unrestricted price schedule $(D)$ at the market competition stage (this involves price discrimination in general). ${ }^{10}$

In order to make the analysis tractable, we will restrict ourselves to simple cases in which consumers are uniformly distributed over some space $X$ (a segment or a circle) and each one of them has an inelastic demand for one unit of the good. Attention will be focused on subgame-perfect equilibria of the two-stage games in which firms anticipate the resulting Nash equilibria in prices at the second stage when choosing their price policies at the first stage. If one firm chooses uniform pricing and the other discriminatory pricing, there may not be a simultaneous move Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies) at the second stage. In what follows, we will assume that the firm which chooses to price uniformly will move first and be the price leader while the other firm will react optimally to the leader’s price. This situation fits the single-basing point pricing (BPP) system in spatial price competition and we will see that it has a natural interpretation in the context of product differentiation. We deal first with spatial price competition and the equilibrium analysis of the BPP system, and second with product differentiation and the pricing of varieties.

## 经济代写|产业经济学代写Industrial Economics代考|Spatial price competition and basing point pricing

We suppose now that consumers are uniformly distributed with a unit density on the interval $X=[0,1]$, with firm 1 located at 0 and firm 2 at 1 . Firms have constant marginal production costs and, without loss of generality, let them be 0 and $c \geq 0$ for firms 1 and 2 , respectively. Transportation costs are linear with slope $t(t>0)$.

Firms may commit to uniform pricing first and then compete on prices accordingly. Four possible cases may arise: $(U, U),(U, D),(D, U)$, or $(D, D)$. If both firms choose to price uniformly, $(U, U)$, then a Nash equilibrium in (FOB) prices obtains at the second stage. If both firms choose to keep complete freedom of pricing, $(D$, $D$ ), then a Nash equilibrium in price schedules obtains at the second stage. If firm 1 chooses to price uniformly and firm 2 does not commit, $(U, D)$, then firm 1 will be a price leader and firm 2 will react optimally to its price (figure $7.2$ depicts the game tree).

This is a natural competitive view of the BPP system with a single-basing point (in which firm 1 is located at $y_1-0$ ). The leader announces a uniform base price, and the price the consumer pays is just the base price plus the transportation cost from 0 to the location of the consumer no matter what firm serves the consumer. Given the base price set by the leader, firm 2 then just undercuts the corresponding full price wherever possible. In other words, the market area of firm 2 is defined by the set of locations for which firm 1’s full price is larger than the marginal production and transportation cost of firm 2. This is so because firm 1 is the first mover so that, for any posted price $p_i$, firm 2 can always capture the demand on $\left{x \in X ; P_1+t\left|y_1-x\right|>c+t\left|y_2-x\right|\right}$ by selling to consumers at $x-\varepsilon$ below firm 1’s full price (see figure $7.3$ where the market areas of firms 1 and 2 are given by $[0, \bar{x}] 0$ and $[\bar{x}, 1]$, respectively, when $\mathrm{c}=0) . .^{11}$ Firm 1 is, therefore, a price leader that sets a uniform FOB price and firm 2 reacts optimally to the leader’s base price by price discriminating. The case $(D, U)$ is similar. We have thus that the mixed cases $(U, D)$ and $(D, U)$ represent single BPP equilibria with base points 0 and 1, respectively. Our approach results in separated market areas and, therefore, no cross-hauling occurs, that is, there is no location where two-way trade is observed. 12

## 有限元方法代写

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## MATLAB代写

MATLAB 是一种用于技术计算的高性能语言。它将计算、可视化和编程集成在一个易于使用的环境中，其中问题和解决方案以熟悉的数学符号表示。典型用途包括：数学和计算算法开发建模、仿真和原型制作数据分析、探索和可视化科学和工程图形应用程序开发，包括图形用户界面构建MATLAB 是一个交互式系统，其基本数据元素是一个不需要维度的数组。这使您可以解决许多技术计算问题，尤其是那些具有矩阵和向量公式的问题，而只需用 C 或 Fortran 等标量非交互式语言编写程序所需的时间的一小部分。MATLAB 名称代表矩阵实验室。MATLAB 最初的编写目的是提供对由 LINPACK 和 EISPACK 项目开发的矩阵软件的轻松访问，这两个项目共同代表了矩阵计算软件的最新技术。MATLAB 经过多年的发展，得到了许多用户的投入。在大学环境中，它是数学、工程和科学入门和高级课程的标准教学工具。在工业领域，MATLAB 是高效研究、开发和分析的首选工具。MATLAB 具有一系列称为工具箱的特定于应用程序的解决方案。对于大多数 MATLAB 用户来说非常重要，工具箱允许您学习应用专业技术。工具箱是 MATLAB 函数（M 文件）的综合集合，可扩展 MATLAB 环境以解决特定类别的问题。可用工具箱的领域包括信号处理、控制系统、神经网络、模糊逻辑、小波、仿真等。